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This paper evaluates three waves of institutional theory that have variously explained participation in 
informal sector entrepreneurship. Informal entrepreneurship has been explained in a first wave of 
institutional theory as resulting from formal institutional failures, in a second wave of theory as 
resulting from an asymmetry between the laws and regulations of formal institutions and the unwritten 
socially shared rules of informal institutions and in a third wave of theory as resulting from a lack of 
both vertical and horizontal trust. To evaluate these waves of institutional theory, evidence is reported 
from a 2015 survey of businesses in Albania. This finds that 30% of turnover of Albanian 
businesses is under-reported, and that this is higher in smaller firms. In terms of the institutional 
failures that explain participation in informal entrepreneurship, the regression analysis reveals 
a strong association between annual under-reporting turnover and the red tape involved in 
dealing with the tax administration and the frequent visits of tax inspectors. Moreover, both 
vertical and horizontal trust are shown to be strongly associated with participation in informal 
entrepreneurship. The paper concludes by discussing the theoretical and policy implications.  
Keywords: informal economy; entrepreneurship; development economics; institutional theory; 
Albania. 
1.   Introduction 
Over the past decade or so, there has been widespread recognition that if entrepreneu ship 
is to be more fully understood in developing economies, there is a need to xtend analysis 
beyond entrepreneurship in the formal economy (Adom and Williams, 2012; Bureau and 
Fendt, 2011; Chepurenko, 2018; Coletto and Bisschop, 2017; Karki and Xheneti, 2018; 
Khan and Wuaddus, 2015; Mannila and Eremicheva, 2018; Lin, 2018; Linares, 2018; Ram 
et al., 2017). This is because two-thirds of all enterprises across the world start-up 
2 Authors’ Name 
 
unregistered (Autio and Fu, 2015) and at least a half of all enterprises globally are 
unregistered (Acs et al., 2013). If the uncalculated number of formal enterprises under-
reporting turnover is also included, an even higher proportion participate in th informal 
economy (Ketchen et al., 2014; Siqueira et al., 2016; Williams et al., 2017, 2018).  
To advance the small but rapidly growing literature on informal entrepren urship, the 
aim of this paper is to evaluate the contemporary scholarship that predominantly explains 
such entrepreneurship using institutional theory (North, 1990). A first wave of 
institutionalist theory explaining informal entrepreneurship deemed it to result from the 
existence of formal institutional failures (Puffer et al., 2010; Sutter et al., 2013), while a 
second wave explained such entrepreneurship to be a result of the asymmetry between the 
laws and regulations of formal institutions and the unwritten socially shared rules of 
informal institutions (Godfrey, 2015; Webb et al., 2009, 2013). This paper evaluates the 
validity of these two waves of institutionalist theory and a new thirdwave of institutionalist 
theory explaining such entrepreneurship as resulting from both a lack of vertical trust (i.e., 
an asymmetry between formal and informal institutions) as well as a lack of horizontal 
trust between entrepreneurs.   
To do this, section 2 provides a brief review of the literature that explains informal 
sector entrepreneurship using institutional theory and formulates hypotheses to test various 
waves of institutionalist explanation. Section 3 then explains the methodology and data 
used for testing the hypothesis, namely a survey with 400 businesses conducted in Albania 
in 2015. Section 4 then presents the results while the last section discusses the th oretical 
and policy implications.  
2.   Literature Review and Hypotheses Development    
Entrepreneurship scholarship has increasingly recognized the importance of studying 
informal sector entrepreneurship (Aidis et al., 2006; Kus, 2014; Morris and Polese, 2014; 
Mróz, 2012; Webb et al., 2009, 2013; Welter et al., 2014; Williams, 2006, 2013, 2015, 
2018; Williams and Kedir, 2016, 2017; Williams and Youssef, 2013). Such scholarship has 
highlighted not only that the majority of entrepreneurs start-up in the informal sector (Autio 
and Fu, 2015) and that many formal enterprises under-report their turnover (Williams, 
2018), but also why participation in the informal economy is more common in some 
countries than others (Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014; Siqueira et al., 2014; Thai and 
Turkina, 2014), who participates (Williams and Horodnic, 2015) and the motives of 
informal entrepreneurs, uch as whether they operate in the informal sector out of choice 
or necessity (Maloney, 2004; Perry and Maloney, 2007; Williams and Round, 2009; 
Williams et al., 2012). 
Increasingly, and reflecting entrepreneurship scholarship more generally, those seeking 
to explain informal entrepreneurship have done so using institutional theory (Baumol and 
Blinder, 2008; Denzau and North, 1994; North, 1990). From an institutional theory 
perspective, institutions refer to the rules of the game that govern behavior. Every society 
is asserted to possess not only formal institutions (i.e., laws and regulations) that are the 
legal rules of the game, but also informal institutions that are the unwritten socially shared 
 Instructions for Typing Manuscripts (Paper’s Title) 3 
 
rules of the game (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; Krasniqi and Desai, 2016), and reflect the 
norms, values and beliefs of citizens and entrepreneurs about what is acceptable and what 
is unacceptable (Denzau and North, 1994). Therefore, from an institutionalist theory 
perspective, formal sector entrepreneurship is entrepreneurial activity that abides by the 
formal rules of the game. Meanwhile, informal sector entrepreneurship is entrepreneurial 
activity that takes place outside of formal rules of the game but abides by the informal rules 
of the game about what is acceptable (Godfrey, 2011; Kistruck et al., 2015; Siqueira et al., 
2016; Webb et al., 2009; Welter et al., 2015; Williams and Gurtoo, 2017), while criminal 
entrepreneurship is entrepreneurial endeavor that takes place outside of both the f rmal and 
informal rules of the game of what is acceptable.  
A review of institutional explanations of informal entrepreneurship, three waves of 
institutionalist thought can be identified that have explained informal entrepreneurship in 
different ways (Williams and Krasniqi, 2018). Here, each of these waves are reviewed in 
turn and hypotheses developed to test each wave of institutionalist theory.  
2.1.   First-wave institutionalist theory: failures of formal institutions 
In the first wave of institutional theory, informal entrepreneurship was viewed as resulting 
from the failings of formal institutions. These formal institutional failings included: 
resource misallocations and inefficiencies; formal institutional voids and weaknesses, and 
formal institutional powerlessness (Webb and Ireland, 2015; Williams, 2018). Here, each 
is considered in turn. 
A first group of formal institutional failings are associated with resource misallocations 
and/or inefficiencies by formal institutions (Qian and Strahan, 2007). These are often the 
product of the “misuse of public office for private gain” (Svensson, 2005; Tonoyan et al., 
2010; Williams, 2018). For example, public sector officials may demand or receive bribes, 
gifts and other payments (e.g., a percentage of a contract) from entrepr eurs and 
enterprises for a service provided (e.g., providing a construction permit). Th s form of 
corruption represents an additional tax for entrepreneurs, which pushes entrepreneurs into 
the informal economy to evade these types of extortion (Williams et al., 2016b). Resource 
misallocations and inefficiencies also arise when formal institutions act in ways that protect 
or maximize the economic rents of elites (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Referred to as 
state capture, this occurs when enterprises or groups of enterprises shap  legislation and 
government policies to their advantage in a non-transparent manner (Fries et al., 2003). 
The result is their preferential treatment and the diversion of state resources to th  provision 
of support for them. For consequence of elites capturing state resourc  is that others suffer 
more burdensome taxes, regulations and costs, and fewer public goods and services for 
their taxes and social contributions (De Soto, 1989; Siqueira et al., 2016; Williams et al., 
2016a). When the perceived value of the goods and services received does not equate with 
the taxes paid, the result can be that entrepreneurs will operate informally. Therefore, to 
evaluate whether informal sector entrepreneurship results from resource misallocations and 
inefficiencies, a proxy indicator is whether entrepreneurs perceive the level of taxes not to 
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equate to the value of the public goods and services received. As such, the following 
hypothesis can be tested: 
 
H1: Entrepreneurs perceiving taxes to be a barrier to the operation of their business will 
have a higher under-reporting of turnover 
 
A second group of formal institutional failings are associated with formal institutional 
voids and weaknesses. There are competing perspectives on which institutioal vo ds and 
weaknesses produce higher levels of informal entrepreneurship. Neo-liberal scholars 
explain informal sector entrepreneurship to be a result of too much state interf rence 
(Becker, 2004; De Soto, 1989, 2001; London and Hart, 2004; Nwabuzor, 2005; Sauvy 
1984). From this perspective, participation in the informal sector is a rational economic 
decision taken to evade over-interference by the state (De Soto, 1989, 2001; Schneider and 
Williams, 2013). Informal entrepreneurs therefore choose to operate in th  i formal sector 
to evade the costs, time and effort of operating formally (De Soto, 1989, 2001; Perry and 
Maloney, 2007; Small Business Council, 2004). Therefore, for neo-lib rals, the formal 
institutional weakness is over-intrusive state interference (De Soto, 1989, 2001; Perry and 
Maloney, 2007; Small Business Council, 2004). To evaluate this, the following hypothesis 
can be tested: 
 
H2: Entrepreneurs perceiving the red tape of the tax administration as a burden to th  
operation of their business will have a higher under-reporting turnover 
 
In contrast, a political economy perspective argues that informal entrepreneurship 
arises due to too little state intervention. Therefore, state intervention is required. Informal 
entrepreneurship, in consequence, is viewed as resulting from too little sta e intervention 
(Aliyev, 2015; Davis, 2006; Gallin, 2001; Portes, 1994; Sassen, 1996; Slavnic, 2010). The 
consequent solution is to pursue state intervention in the economy and welfare provision 
to mitigate the requirement for citizens to enter informal entrepreneurship as a survival 
strategy (Small Business Council, 2004). However, this will only be effective if the social 
contract is maintained between the state and the population (Williams, 2018). For this to 
be achieved, there is a need to make entrepreneurs aware of the public goods and services 
that they received in return for the taxes paid (Williams, 2018). To evaluate this, the 
following hypothesis can be tested: 
 
H3: Entrepreneurs perceiving their tax payments as used to fund important services will 
have less under-reporting turnover. 
 
A third group of formal institutional failings relate to formal inst tutional 
powerlessness. Powerlessness here refers to the lack of ability of the authorities to enforce 
the formal rules (Webb et al., 2009). This lack of power of enforcement authorities leads 
to informal entrepreneurship having low costs, due to the lack of likelihood of detection, 
 Instructions for Typing Manuscripts (Paper’s Title) 5 
 
and high benefits of informal entrepreneurship, coupled with high costs and low benefits 
of formalization, not least due to the inability of authorities to make formality an attractive 
option (e.g., in terms of social insurance benefits). The outcome is that when entrepreneurs 
weigh up the costs and benefits, they will make the decision to operate informally because 
the benefits of formality are insufficient to outweigh the benefits of informality.  
To resolve this, enforcement authorities need to develop their ability to alter the 
cost/benefit ratio. Two basic methods exist for doing so at present, both of wich focus 
upon increasing the costs of informality. Firstly, they can increase the costs of informality 
by increasing the administrative sanctions and penalties. Secondly, they can improve the 
perceived or actual likelihood of detection (Williams and Puts, 2017). In many countries, 
the level at which sanctions can be set are hindered by what is perceived as “just”. The 
consequence is that much of the emphasis is put on increasing the perceived or actual 
probability of detection. This is mainly achieved by increasing the number of inspections. 
Nevertheless, the evidence-base is inconclusive on whether this is an effectiv  strategy. 
Some scholarship suggests that raising the likelihood of detection decreases informality, at 
least for some income groups (e.g., Alm et al., 1995), but otherscholarship suggests that 
increasing the likelihood of detection does not reduce informal entrepreneurship (e.g., 
Webley and Halstead, 1986). Instead, it results in greater non-compliance because of the 
breakdown of trust between the state and enterprises (Murphy and Harris, 2007; Tyler et 
al., 2007). To evaluate this and the wider issue of the power of authorities, the following 
hypothesis can be tested: 
 
H4: Entrepreneurs perceiving the number of tax inspections to be a burden to the operation 
of their business will have a higher under-reporting turnover.  
2.2.   Second-wave institutionalist theory: institutional asymmetry 
The focus in first-wave institutional theory was only on formal institutional failures. In a 
second wave of institutionalist theory, it was recognized that this ignored the role of 
cognitive and normative institutions, which can be joined together in the category of 
informal institutions (Godfrey, 2015; North, 1990; Scott, 2008). Formal institutional 
failings do not always result in informality. They only do so when the socially shared 
values, beliefs and norms of entrepreneurs and enterprises do not align with the formal 
rules (Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014; Godfrey, 2015; Webb et al., 2009; Williams and 
Shahid, 2016; Williams et al., 2017).  
In consequence, in second-wave institutional theory, formal institutional failings per
se are not the determinant of informal entrepreneurship. When formal and informal 
institutions are “complementary” and align, informal entrepreneurship will not result from 
formal institutional failings. Instead, formal institutional failings only result in informality 
when the formal and informal institutions do not align, and therefore the rules of informal 
institutions act as a “substitute” for the formal rules (Godfrey, 2011; 2015; Williams et al., 
2015, 2016a). As Webb et al. (2009) assert, “the informal economy exists because of the 
incongruence between what is defined as legitimate by formal and informal institut ons.” 
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If formal and informal institutions are not aligned, the outcome is informality which, 
although it is illegal in terms of the formal rules, is viewed as socially legitimate (De Castro 
et al., 2014; Kistruck et al., 2015; Siqueira et al., 2016; Webb et al., 2013, 014). Indeed, 
the greater the degree of non-alignment of the formal and informal rules, the higher is the 
prevalence of informality (Williams and Shahid, 2016).  
Therefore, second-wave institutional theory has employed proxy measures of the 
degree of asymmetry between the formal and informal institutions. O e such proxy 
measure is the perceived level of public sector corruption. When public sector corruption 
is perceived to be higher, the greater is the degree of institutional symmetry (Daude et al., 
2013; Torgler, 2012). To evaluate the level of institutional asymmetry, the following 
hypothesis can be tested: 
 
H5: Entrepreneurs perceiving corruption among governmental officials as a barrier to the 
operation of their business will have a higher under-reporting turnover. 
2.3.   Third-wave institutional theory: vertical and horizontal trust 
Second-wave institutional theory has near enough entirely focused upon the degree of 
“vertical trust” (i.e., the non-alignment of the formal and informal institutions) and its 
relationship with informality. Less attention has been paid to the relationship between 
informality and the degree of “horizontal trust” (between entrepreneurs). However, it can 
be asserted that entrepreneurs and enterprises are more likely to under-report tunover if 
they perceive under-reporting of turnover as widespread. This is because they might 
consider that many others under-report turnover and therefore see no r ason why they 
should do so.  
Indeed, a small but growing evidence-base exists on horizontal trust but until now, only 
in relation to voluntary tax compliance, rather than specifically in relation to engag ment 
in informality. Studies have revealed compliance is significantly associated with the actual 
and/or perceived behavior of other enterprises and citizens (Ajzen, 1991; Chang and Lai, 
2004; Mendoza Rodriguez and Wielhouwer, 2015; Narsa et al., 2016). For example, an 
experiment in three European countries (Belgium, France and the Netherlands) eveals that 
compliance significantly increased among those receiving information that there was only 
a very low level of non-compliance (Lefebvre et al., 2015).  
Therefore, to further build upon second-wave institutional theory that a lack of vertical 
trust is significantly associated with informality, third-wave institutional theory views 
informality to result from not only formal institutional failings that produce a non-
alignment between formal and informal institutions (i.e., a lack of vertical trust) but also 
from a lack of horizontal trust. To test this, the following hypothesis can be evaluated: 
 
H6: Entrepreneurs perceiving unfair competition as a barrier to the operation of their 
business will have a higher under-reporting turnover. 
 Instructions for Typing Manuscripts (Paper’s Title) 7 
 
3.   Data and Variables 
3.1.   Data and sample  
To evaluate these different waves of institutional theory that variously explain informal 
entrepreneurship, a survey was conducted with 400 Albanian enterprises, comprising 
micro, small, medium and large firms and covering the main economic sectors 
(manufacturing, service, trade). The survey was developed by the Albanian Center for 
Economic Research (ACER) - an Albanian research institute - in 2015and one of the 
authors of this paper played a lead role in the research project (Albanian Center for 
Economic Research, 2015). The face-to-face method was utilized to complete the 
questionnaires. Interviews were conducted by a trained team of Masters’ students from the 
Faculty of Economics at the University of Tirana and the ACER research team supervi ed 
their work. The interviews were conducted with individuals holding a limited number of 
positions within the company. Namely, they were either the owner, executiv  director, or 
finance director.   
The enterprises were selected randomly from the General Tax Directorate (GTD) data 
base of enterprises. The sample was stratified based on two variables, namely: size (1-4; 5-
9; 10-49; 50 or more employees) and sector (manufacturing, services, trade). In terms of 
respondents’ distribution by economic sector, the service sector dominates with 46.3% of 
respondents in this sector, followed by manufacturing with 29% and tr de with 24.7%. 
Overall, all business sizes were equally represented. Some 26.2% of respondents wer  from 
micro-enterprises, 24.4% small companies, 26.4% medium-sized companies and 22.9% 
large companies. 
The questionnaire collected data on their perceptions of the business climate in Albania 
and its effect on the operation of their business as well as firm-level data such s the size 
and age of the enterprise. On the issue of institutional variables, the survey included 
questions to test the hypotheses formulated, including their perception on tax rates, tax 
administration bureaucracy, inspections from the tax authorities, corruption among 
governmental officials, governmental use of tax payments and unfair competition. In 
addition, the questionnaire required businesses to provide an approximate percentage of 
annual declared turnover of a typical firm in their sector so to calculate the under-declared 
turnover. All details regarding the firm and institutional variables are reported in Table A1 
in the Appendix.  
3.2.   Variables  
Drawing on the variables previous analyses r veal are significantly associated with 
participation in the informal economy (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gerxhani, 2011, 2016; 
Gerxhani, 2007; Williams et al, 2017), this study collected data on the following firm-level 
control variables and institutional variables.  
The dependent variable, considering the sensitivity of the information required, 
indirectly asked businesses about the proportion of turnover that is not declared. This is a 
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continuous variable based on responses to the following question: “Recognizing the 
difficulties that many firms face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, overall in 
your view approximately what part of the annual turnover of a typical firm in your sector 
or area of activity is officially reported?” To calculate the proportion of turnover that is not 
declared, all responses were deducted from 100.  
The independent and control variables are as follows:  
Firm age: Number of years the firm has been operating in Albania.  
Firm size: A categorical variable for the number of employees with value 1 for micro firms 
(1-4 employees), 2 for small firms (5-9), 3 for medium firms (10-49) and 4 for large firms 
(50 or more employees). 
Taxes are too high: Firms were asked to provide their perceptions if high taxes represent a 
barrier to their business using a Likert Scale of 5= extremely serious 1=not at all serious. 
Responses with 5 ‘‘extremely serious’’ were recoded to 1 and 0 otherwise to produce a 
dummy variable. 
Red tape of tax administration: Firms were asked on their perception on how burden of 
some aspects of working with tax authorities, namely administration of tax forms and the 
time it takes in a Likert scale where 5= Severe burden and 1= Not at all a burden. Responses 
with 5 ‘‘severe burden’’ were recoded to 1 and 0 otherwise to produce dummy variable.  
Government use of tax payments: Firms were asked to evaluate how they would consider 
the following incentive as a way to encourage the formalization of the economy: Knowing 
that tax payments are used to fund important services, in a Likert Scale of 5= xtremely 
important and 1=not at all important. Responses with 5 ‘‘extremely important’’ were 
recoded to 1 and 0 otherwise to produce a dummy variable.  
Number of visits by the tax inspectors: Firms were asked to evaluate whether number of 
visits by tax inspectors represent a burden to the operation of their business, using a likert 
scale of 5= severe burden 1=not at all a burden. Responses with 5 “severe burden” were 
recoded to 1 and 0 otherwise to produce dummy variable. 
Corruption among government officials: Firms were asked to provide their perception on 
corruption among government officials being an obstacle for operation of their business in 
a likert scale of 5= a very severe obstacle and 1=no obstacle. Responses with 5 “severe 
obstacle” were recoded to 1 and 0 otherwise to produce a dummy variable.  
Unregistered competitors represent a severe burden (unfair competition): Firms provided 
their perception whether other unregistered competitors represent an obstacle to the current 
operations or economic success of their business, in a likert scale of 5= a very severe 
obstacle and 1=no obstacle. Responses with 5 “a very severe obstacle” were recoded to 1 
and 0 otherwise to produce a dummy variable.  
3.3.   Empirical model 
Considering the nature of under-reporting turnover as a continuous variable, a linear 
regression model is employed to determine the factors that are associated with the under-
reporting of turnover in Albania. Model 1 estimates firm level variables while Model 2 
estimates both firm level and institutional variables. The following econometric model 
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represents the final pattern where く0 represents the intercept, Xi represents the vector of 
independent variables and ii represents the error term, while Xi is composed of firm level 
and institutional variables.  
 
Unreported turnover = く0 + く1Xi + …くnn + ii 
 
4.   Results 
The overall finding is that Albanian business under-report 30.09 percent of their annual 
turnover. Hence, this intimates that the informal economy is relatively large in Albania 
compared with other European countries (Williams, 2018). Therefore, this raises the 
following questions: which enterprises are more likely to under-report turnove ? And 
which institutionalist explanations are valid as explanations for participation in informal 
entrepreneurship?  
Before answering these questions by testing the above hypotheses, the diagnostic 
testing needs to be reported to evaluate whether heteroscedasticity and non-normality is 
present. In addition, multicollinearity was tested for using the Variable Inflated Factor 
(VIF). The finding was this was not found to be a problem in the estimations (see Table 
A2 in the Appendix). The VIF Mean =1.16 which is acceptable as far it is less than ten. 
Furthermore, based on the R-squared in Table 1 which varies from 2.9 percent (basic 
model) to 10.5 percent (full model), it means that the two linear regression model explains 
more than ten percent of variation in the dependent variable.  
To test the hypotheses, Table 1 reports the results of two linear regression models. 
Model 1 analysis the correlation the level of unreported turnover and firm size and firm 
age (firm-level variables). The finding is that there is no statistically significa t association 
between firm age and the level of unreported turnover. However, when it comes to firm 
size, the results substantiate size to be a strong predictor. The larger the enterpris , the 
lower is the likelihood to under-declare turnover. Namely, if the enterpris  size increases 
by one percent, the under-reported turnover among Albanian firms decreas s by 2.7 
percentage points.  
Model 2 adds the institutional level variables to the firm-level variables to explore the 
association between various institutional conditions and the level of under-reported 
turnover. In model 2, the results in relation to firm size and firm age are the same as in 
Model 1. In terms of the institutional variables and their impact on under-repo ted turnover, 
the results uncover no correlation between the Albanian firms’ perception that high taxes 
represent a burden on the operation of their business and the level of under-reporting of 
turnover (refuting H1). However, enterprises that consider the bureaucracy of tax 
administration as an obstacle to the operation of their business do have significantly higher 
levels of turnover under-reporting (confirming H2). There is no statistically significant 
relationship between the under-reporting turnover and the firms’ perception their tax 
payments are used to fund important services (refuting H3). Nevertheless, firms that 
consider the number of tax inspections as an obstacle to the operation of theirbusiness do 
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have a higher under-reporting turnover (confirming H4). Similarly, corruption and unfair 
competition are good predictors of the level of turnover under-reporting. Albanian firms 
that consider corruption as an obstacle to doing business are more likely to r port higher 
levels of turnover under-reporting (confirming H5). Those considering that corruption has 
a profound effect on the operation of their businesses have on average 4.3 percentage points 
higher underreporting turnover compared with the other group who do not think corruption 
has such an impact. Likewise, enterprises that consider unfair competition (other
businesses operating in the informal economy) as a challenge to the operati n of their 
business do report higher level of turnover under-reporting (confirmi g H6). Enterprises 
that consider other businesses operating in the informal economy as an obt cle have on 
average 4.1 percentage points higher under-reporting of turnover than those w o believe 
the opposite.  
 
Table 1: Linear regression model of turnover under-reporting in Albania.  
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 
 
Basic Model (Firm Level 
Variables) 




B Std. Error B 
Std. 
Error 
Firm age .100 .142 .072 .142 
Firm size  -2.799*** .857 -2.297** .895 
Institutional-level     
Taxes are too high   .365 2.092 
Red tax of tax administration    5.153* 3.133 




Number of visits by tax inspectors   4.608* 2.463 
Corruption among government officials   4.340** 2.044 
Unregistered competitors represent a severe burden   4.163** 1.972 
Constant  35.934*** 2.320 29.324*** 2.831 
Observations  363 340 
R-squared 0.029 0.105 
Significance: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
 
5.   Discussion and Conclusions 
Reporting a 2015 survey of 400 enterprises in Albania, this paper has revealed that 
enterprises on average under-report 30.09 percent of their annual turnover. Evaluating the 
various waves of institutional theory so as to explain the high level of under-reporting of 
turnover, the finding is that the second- and third-wave institutionalist explanations are 
supported which identify the level of vertical and horizontal trust as significantly associated 
with informal entrepreneurship, whilst the formal institutional failings of first-wave 
institutionalist explanations significantly associated with informal entreprenu ship are the 
bureaucracy of tax administration and the number of tax inspections. Here, the theoretical 
and policy implications of these findings are discussed.  
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The key theoretical implication of this paper is that it makes three distinct advances in 
relation to institutionalist explanations of informal sector entrepreneurship. Firstly, it 
reveals that not all formal institutional failings discussed in first-wave institutional thought 
are significantly associated with informal entrepreneurship. Only the bureauc acy of the 
tax administration and the number of tax inspections are significantly associated. Secondly, 
it has shown that second-wave institutional theory appears valid in that informal 
entrepreneurship is found to be significantly associated with the non-alignment of the 
formal and informal institutions. A lack of vertical trust in the formal institutions by 
entrepreneurs seems to be a key explanation for the level of turnover und r-reporting in 
Albania. Third and finally, third-wave institutionalist theory is validated. A lack of both 
vertical as well as horizontal trust is found to be significantly associated with the 
prevalence of the informal entrepreneurship. Therefore, the key finding of this study of 
informal entrepreneurship in Albania is that future scholarship on informal 
entrepreneurship should perhaps move away from first-wave institutional theory that 
focused upon formal institutional failures as determinants of informal sector 
entrepreneurship. Rather, and as discussed by second- and third-wave institutio al theory, 
a greater focus is required on explaining informal entrepreneurship in terms of the lack of 
vertical trust (i.e., the non-alignment of the formal and informal institutions) as well as the 
issue of the lack of horizontal trust, which until now has received little attention.    
These findings also have important policy implications. So far, and reflecting first-
wave institutional theory, policy-making has focused upon improving the formal 
institutions, largely by increasing the power of authorities. This has been achieved either 
by using disincentives (“sticks”) to deter informal sector entrepreneurship or incentives 
(“carrots”) to facilitate formal sector entrepreneurship (Matthias et al., 2014). Most state 
authorities have tended to rely on disincentives to make the cost of engaging in informality 
higher than the pay-off from participation (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). Incentives to 
encourage entrepreneurs to operate in the formal economy have only recently started to be 
used (Williams and Puts, 2017).  
Nevertheless, even if one changes the cost/benefit ratio confronting entrepreneurs, this 
does not alter the lack of vertical and horizontal trust which this paper reveals are strongly 
associated with informal entrepreneurship. Therefore, rather than alter the cos /benefit ratio 
confronting entrepreneurs to bring about enforced compliance, there is perhaps a need for 
greater emphasis on pursuing voluntary compliance. This requires changes i  
entrepreneurs’ beliefs regarding the acceptability of under-reporting turnover. To do so, 
three policy measures can be pursued. Firstly, there is a need to educate entrepreneurs about 
the wider value of formality to change their behavior (Saeed and Shah, 2011). Secondly, 
marketing campaigns to raise awareness about the benefits of formalization can bepursued 
which either informal entrepreneurs of the costs of turnover under-reporting or the benefits 
of fully reporting turnover. Finally, normative appeals can be used, which in Estonia 
resulted in 46% of entrepreneurs paying more taxes (Lill and Nurmela, 2009). 
However, to achieve greater vertical trust (i.e., alignment of the formal and informal 
institutions), formal institutions also need to change. Entrepreneurs will not reduce the 
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under-reporting of turnover if they continue to lack trust in government and there is 
extensive public sector corruption and state capture. Th refore, a modernization of formal 
institutions is required. There is a need to improve not only procedural fairness, which is 
the extent to which entrepreneurs believe they are paying their fair share compared with 
others (Molero and Pujol, 2012) but also procedural justice, namely a belief y 
entrepreneurs that the tax authority is treating them in a respectful, impartial and 
responsible manner (Murphy, 2005) as well as redistributive justice, namely that 
entrepreneurs believe they receive sufficient public goods and services in return for the 
taxes paid (Kirchgässner, 2010).  
Nevertheless, this paper has revealed that it is not only vertical trust that must be 
improved. So too is there a need to improve horizontal trust. When state authorities 
publicize figures on the size of the informal economy, few have so far reflected on whether 
this increases its size by further decreasing horizontal trust. However, great caution is 
needed when publicizing high estimates of its size. Such figures allow entrepreneurs to 
neutralize any guilt about their own non-compliance. To prevent such denial of 
responsibility, when publicizing estimates of the size of informal entrepreneurship, it 
would therefore be useful to make public the average level of evasion so that informal 
entrepreneurs do not see themselves as engaged in minor discrepancies compared with 
others.  
Despite these theoretical and policy implications, some caution is required. The 
limitation of this study is that it evaluates the different waves of institutionalist theory in 
the context of only one country, namely Albania. Future studies therefor need to replicate 
this survey in other national contexts and global regions. Furthermore, the  is a need to 
experiment with using direct questions on entrepreneurs’ participation in the informal 
economy. Surveys of citizens reveal that due to informal economic activity being socially 
legitimate, even if illegal from the viewpoint of formal rules, participants are willing to 
discuss their participation in such activity (see Williams, 2015). It now eeds to be tested 
whether this also applies when undertaking surveys of entrepreneurs by a king them 
directly whether they under-report turnover.    
In conclusion, if this paper encourages scholars of entrepreneurship to undertake 
studies of institutionalist explanations of informal sector entrepreneurship in other 
contexts, it will have achieved one of its intentions. If this then results in state authorities 
considering how to improve vertical and horizontal trust, and recognition by governments 
that this is a key requirement for tackling informal entrepreneurship, rather than simply 
using “sticks” to deter informality, then this paper will have achieved its broader intention.  
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Table A1. Descriptive statistics of surveyed enterprises 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Unreported turnover 365 0 90 30.09 17.233 
Firm age 400 0 25 10.52 6.706 
Firm size 397 1 4 2.46 1.111 
Taxes are too high 393 0 1 .37 .483 
Red tape of tax administration  396 0 1 .11 .315 
Number of visits by the tax inspector 393 0 1 .20 .397 
Corruption among government officials 394 0 1 .36 .481 
Knowing that tax payments are used to fund important 
services 394 0 1 .45 .498 
Unregistered competitors represent a severe burden 
(unfair competition) 




Table A2 Test for multicollinearity using the Variable Inflation Factor (VIF) 
Variable  Tolerance  VIF 
Taxes are too high .793 1.261 
Tax administration burden .873 1.146 
Number of visits by the tax inspector .835 1.197 
Other unregistered businesses remain a problem .863 1.159 
Corruption among government officials .853 1.173 
Knowing that tax payments are used to fund important services .929 1.077 
Firm age  0.877 1.140 
Firm size  .839 1.192 
 
